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NOTES
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A REVIEW OF RECENT SUPREME
COURT DECISIONS
I. Introduction
On July 2, 1976, the United States Supreme Court announced opinions in
five cases dealing with the issue of capital punishment.' In each of these cases
the Court held that the death penalty did not invariably violate the Constitution.2
Thus, the question left unanswered in Furman v. Georgia,3 the constitutionality
of the death penalty per se, was finally considered and resolved.
More specifically, in three of the decisions, Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v.
Florida, and Jurek v. Texas, the Supreme Court upheld the respective state
death penalty provisions. Constitutionality was found primarily because these
statutes provided judges and jurors with sufficient standards to adequately guide
their discretion in imposing the death sentence. Conversely, in Woodson v. North
Carolina and Roberts v. Louisiana the Court struck down mandatory death
statutes as violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. Such mandatory
death penalty provisions were held unconstitutional because they failed to provide
a rationalized sentencing process. The opinions indicated that this rationalized
process requires that the sentence procedure be nondiscriminatory; in other
words the process must draw a meaningful distinction between a case in which
the death sentence is warranted and one in which it is not.
Traditionally the Court has had numerous opportunities to rule on the
validity of the death penalty. However, until the decisions rendered this past
July, the Court had been noticeably reluctant to consider whether the death
penalty, per se, violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments.4 Though avoid-
ing this basic question, the Court, with a single exception, steadfastly refrained
from sanctioning imposition of the death penalty. This avoidance was managed
by a consistent finding of procedural flaws in the various sentencing processes
brought before the Court.
It is the purpose of this note to analyze the history of litigation before the
Supreme Court concerning capital punishment as it relates to the "cruel and
unusual" clause of the eighth amendment. Particular emphasis will be placed
on the most recent cases which are significant because they mark the first time in
recent history where the Court upheld the validity of capital punishment per se.
As the majority of the Justices felt that the Court is not the proper governmental
branch to rule on the propriety of this punishment, the significance of the judicial
philosophy of a particular Court will be stressed. Additionally, the new pro-
1 The five cases were: Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct.
2960, Jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, Roberts
v. Louisiana, 96 S. Ct. 3001 (1976).
2 96 S. Ct. 2923.
3 408 U.S. 238 '(1972).
4 It should be noted that the Court had assumed its validity without a specific holding
in several cases. However, in the past decade, in those cases where the Court was specifically
asked to consider the constitutionality of the death penalty per se, it avoided making a
determination.
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cedural requirements mandated by the Court will be analyzed in an attempt to
suggest strategies and considerations which may be useful to attorneys litigating
death penalty cases or to legislatures in their efforts to enact legislation comport-
ing with the new standard.
II. Background
A. Definition of Cruel and Unusual
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" was itself the subject of much
judicial controversy in earlier years as an attempt was made to conceive a gen-
erally accepted understanding of its scope. The history of Supreme Court
litigation concerning capital punishments indicates that the precise contours of
the phrase were defined with some difficulty. However, from early on the
Court was confident that "unnecessary cruelty" was the underlying concept of
the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition.' The notion of proscribing un-
necessary cruelty is clearly the cornerstone of the eighth amendment's meaning.
As the concept of "cruel and unusual" was further articulated in Supreme
Court cases, it became apparent that capital punishment was not among those
punishments constitutionally proscribed.6 Death sentences fell outside the ban
because they did not involve torture or lingering death. Furthermore, despite the
ultimate nature of the punishment, it was not considered inhuman or barbarous,
generally due to its long history of acceptance!
An advanced articulation of this eighth amendment concept was provided
in Weems v. United States.' This case marked the first instance in which the
Supreme Court overruled a legislative penalty.9 In Weems, the petitioner was
convicted of deceiving and defrauding the United States Government of the
Philippine Islands by falsifying a cash book. The minimum prescribed penalty
was confinement in a penal institution for twelve years at hard and painful labor.
Upon conviction, a defendant was to be constantly bound in chains and stripped
of parental and property rights, among others. Furthermore, upon release, the
defendant was subjected to lifetime surveillance and perpetual absolute dis-
qualification. 0
Justice McKenna, writing for the majority, found this punishment to be
both cruel and unusual. The significance of this decision stems from its intro-
duction of two new considerations in this area. First, the Court was deeply
disturbed by the excessiveness of the punishment in light of the nature of the
5 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1879).
6 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890). In this context it is somewhat un-
fortunate that in this case the Court chose to label the extinguishment of life with the adjective
"mere." It seems reasonable to conclude that the convicted defendant, the judge who
pronounced the sentence, and the executioner who carried it out did not regard the punish-
ment as a "mere" extinguishment of life. It is noteworthy that in more recent decisions the
Court has been very careful to avoid similar characterizations.
7 See note 20, infra.
8 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
9 408 U.S. 238, 325 (Marshall, J., concurring).
10 217 U.S. 349, 364-65. Perpetual disqualification was "the deprivation of office, even
though it be held by popular election, the deprivation of the right to vote .. . and the loss of
retirement pay. .. ." Id.
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crime involved.1 Accordingly, the majority adopted the concept of propor-
tionality as essential to complete compliance with the constitutional demand of
the eighth amendment.
Furthermore, though Weems did not involve capital punishment, it intro-
duced a characterization of the eighth amendment which would have a significant
impact on later death penalty decisions. The Court characterized cruel and
unusual as being a dynamic, flexible concept which was subject to modification.
The constitutional clause was said to be "progressive, and ... not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
a humane justice."1 2 In later years, this notion was seized upon by several
Justices, in the capital punishment context, in arguing that society had progressed
to the point where the death penalty had become cruel and unusual.3
The eighth amendment's formative phase came to an end in Weems. While
the accepted meaning of the amendment would subsequently be refined and
polished, its basic contours were clearly established. Labelling a punishment
cruel and unusual indicated that its infliction was torturous, unnecessary, barbar-
ous or excessive in light of the crime the defendant had perpetrated. More im-
portantly, however, the Supreme Court had determined that the meaning of
cruel and unusual was not static, but could acquire new meaning as the values of
society changed.
B. Transitional Developments
Since factual situations are so diverse, it is virtually impossible for a single
legal definition to adequately deal with each situation in which it arises. There-
fore, nuances of a definition must be established to allow the judiciary sufficient
leeway in rendering decisions. This is particularly true when the concept of
cruel and unusual is interpreted. Naturally, the evolution of such a doctrine is
marked with anomalies and inconsistencies.
One such inconsistency is the Court's consideration of the role mental suffer-
ing plays in the determination of eighth amendment prohibitions. In Weems, the
Court found the imposition of lifetime surveillance sufficient to render a punish-
ment unconstitutional. 4 As no physical suffering attached to surveillance, the
conclusion must have rested upon considerations of mental suffering. In contrast,
other contexts exist in which mental suffering has not been deemed to be a valid
consideration. 5 For example, mental suffering was found to play only a
11 Id. at 377. In so holding the Court adopted the position of the minority in O'Neil v.
Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892). In the O'Neil decision, Justice Field objected to a punish-
ment for selling intoxicating liquors which was more severe than the prescribed penalties for
burglary, highway robbery, manslaughter, forgery or perjury. (Id. at 339). Justice Field also
stated that the prohibition of the eighth amendment was directed against "all punishments
which by their excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged."
(Id. at 339-40). This is apparently the first articulation of the notion that the punishment
must suit the crime by the Supreme Court. In Weems, this became the position of a majority
of the Court.
12 Id. at 378.
13 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 291 (Brennan J., concurring) see also 408 U.S.
at 360 (Marshall, J., concurring.)
14 Weems v. United States, supra note 8 at 381.
15 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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secondary role when the Court upheld a procedure which twice sent a defendant
to the electric chair. Where the first attempt to electrocute a defendant failed
due to a mechanical defect the state desired to repeat the process. The Court
upheld this scheme as not being cruel and unusual.'6 If any conclusion can be
drawn from these cases, it is that mental suffering is a factor which is considered,
but only in light of the other facts and circumstances surrounding each particular
case.
The case of Trop v. Dulles" is further evidence of the paradoxical position
the Supreme Court has taken in defining the cruel and unusual phrase. Thus,
while statutory imposition of death has been consistently upheld, the Court in
Trop found that Congress was forbidden to impose the penalty of citizenship
forfeiture for the crime of wartime desertion."8 A reconciliation of such defini-
tional applications is difficult to achieve.
Following the Weems rationale, the Court frequently noted that the eighth
amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."' 9 Despite this admonition for con-
temporary indicia, history and tradition were openly considered."0 Both Trop
and more recent decisions clearly indicate that while the "evolving standards
doctrine" is espoused, in actuality the test is two-pronged, with both historical
and contemporary societal attitudes playing a role in the decision-making
process.2
Despite these anomalies, the definition of cruel and unusual became more
sophisticated with each interpretation. Early in its development consideration of
the dignity of man became a central aspect of eighth amendment litigation.2
The states' power to punish had to be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards.2" Such civilized standards came to require that whenever a defendant
loses "the right to have rights"24 the punishment must be carefully examined for
potential abuses.
Initially, it appears as though these criteria of evolving and civilized stan-
dards could readily be utilized to invalidate the death penalty. 5 However, the
Trop Court, in dicta, expressly stated that capital punishment was constitu-
tionally acceptable.26 It was this anomaly which prompted Justice Frankfurter to
pose the following question:
16 Id. at 446.
17 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
18 Id. at 103.
19 Id. at 101.
20 Id. at 99-100.
21 The Court's analysis follows:
Whatever the arguments may be against capital punishment, both on moral grounds
and in terms of accomplishing the purposes of punishment-and they are forceful-
the death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it
is still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of
cruelty. Id. at 99.
22 Id. at 100. The comments of Chief Justice Warren should be read in light of the
comment he made indicating that the exact scope of cruel and unusual had not been detailed
by the Court. Id. at 99.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 102.
25 As will be discussed later, the Supreme Court of California did use a similar rationale
to overrule its state statute calling for the death penalty. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628,
493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, czrt. denied 406 U. S. 958 (1972).
26 356 U.S. 86, 99.
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Is constitutional dialectic so empty of reason that it can be seriously urged
that the loss of citizenship is a fate worse than death?
27
The transitional period indicates that although the definition of 'cruel and
unusual" had acquired general contours, applying its abstract terms to concrete
factual circumstances was a difficult task. However, despite these problems, the
constitutionality of the death sentence was never in doubt.
C. Procedural Definition
The next stage of development in this area witnessed the eighth amendment
acquire a new meaning, quite different from prior considerations. The Court
remained steadfast in its refusal to consider the basic issue: Does the death
penalty per se violate the eighth amendment? However, by finding procedural
defects in various sentencing processes, the Court skillfully refused to sanction a
death sentence while avoiding this ultimate decision. The procedural analysis
was wholly unprecedented. Thus it was justifiable to hypothesize that the Court
was using the procedural technique as a means of preparing the public for a
major policy change.
There are several illustrations of this technique in Supreme Court cases.
For example, under the Federal Kidnapping Act,2" the death penalty was a
potential punishment only if the accused demanded a jury trial.2" The Act was
held unconstitutional because it imposed "an impermissible burden upon the
exercise of a constitutional right."" A statute which interfered with the right
to demand a jury trial and plead not guilty could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Further eighth amendment protection was provided when the defendant
entered a guilty plea. It became unconstitutional for a trial court to accept a
guilty plea to, a capital offense without an affirmative showing that the guilty
plea was entered intelligently and voluntarily. 1 The eighth amendment insured
protections greater than examining the nature of the punishment itself. The
defendant was provided procedural protection at the pre-trial stage when a plea
was entered and when electing to try the case before a judge or a jury.
The eighth amendment was held to embody additional procedural safe-
guards when a jury trial was chosen. Jurors could not be excluded merely
27 Id. at 125, (Frankfurter, J., dissenting.)
28 At that time the act provided:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate ... commerce, any person who has been
unlawfully ... kidnapped . . .and held for ransom . .. or otherwise ... shall be
punished (1) by death if the kidnapped person has not been liberated unharmed,
and if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend, or (2) by imprisonment for any
term of years or for life, if the death penalty is not imposed.
The Court noted that the statute set forth no procedure for imposing the death penalty upon
a defendant who may waive the right to a jury trial or upon one who pleads guilty. 390 U.S.
at 570-71.
29 Id. at 571.
30 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S, 570, 572 (1968).
31 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
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because they voiced general objections to the death penalty.3 2 Apparently, only
veniremen who unconditionally opposed capital punishment could successfully
be challenged for cause.
Thus, although the pattern was clear it was not without deviation. As each
confrontation brought the Court closer to the ultimate issue, further procedural
demands could be found which would postpone the final decision. The evasive
technique was employed by the Supreme Court for a twenty-three-year period
beginning in 1957." In 1970, however, the Court reversed the trend of refusing
to affirm a death sentence, in McGautha v. California, when it allowed the jury
to impose the death penalty in a procedure void of governing standards Such a
process was acceptable because it was thought to be impossible to articulate stan-
dards which would adequately enable the jury to differentiate between the situa-
tions meriting a death sentence and those which did not.35 The Court's sanc-
32 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). At the time of the trial the Illinois
statute provided:
In trials for murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who shall, on
being examined, state that he has conscientious scruples against capital punishment,
or that he is opposed to the same. ILL. Rxv. STAT., c. 38, 1 743 '(1959). Id. at 512.
33 The prior case where the court had sanctioned the death sentence was the Louisiana
ex rel. Francis case in 1947.
34 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 186 (1971). McGautha was convicted of two
counts of armed robbery and one count of first-degree murder as charged. During the penalty
trial, at that time under California law punishment was determined in a separate proceeding
following the trial on the issue of guilt, the jury was instructed in the following language:
in this part of the trial the law does not forbid you from being influenced by pity for
the defendants and you may be governed by mere sentiment and sympathy for the
defendants in arriving at a proper penalty in this case; however, the law does not
forbid you from being governed by mere conjecture, prejudice, public opinion or
public feeling.
The defendants in this case have been found guilty of the offense of murder in
the first degree, and it is now your duty to determine which of the penalties provided
by law should be imposed on each defendant for that offense. Now, in arriving at this
determination you should consider all of the evidence received here in court presented
by the people and defendants throughout the trial before this jury. You may also
consider all of the evidence of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of each
defendant's background and history, and of the facts in aggravation or mitigation
of the penalty which have been received here in court. However, it is not essential
to your decision that you find mitigating circumstances on the one hand or evidence
in aggravation of the offense on the other hand.
. . . Notwithstanding facts, if any, proved in mitigation or aggravation, in
determining which punishment shall be inflicted, you are entirely free to act ac-
cording to your own judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion. That verdict must
express the individual opinion of each juror.
Now, beyond prescribing the two alternative penalties, the law itself provides no
standard for the guidance of the jury in the selection of the penalty, but, rather,
commits the whole matter of determining which of the two penalties shall be fixed
to the judgment, conscience, and absolute discretion of the jury. In the determina-
tion of that matter, if the jury does agree, it must be unanimous as to which of the
two penalties is imposed.
402 U.S. 189-90.
35 Id. at 204. The fact that justice Harlan felt it impossible to articulate adequate
standards for the jury to employ is further reflected by the following statement:
In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of human knowledge,
we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the untrammeled discretion of
the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital cases is offensive to anything
in the Constitution. The States are entitled to assume that jurors confronted with
the truly awesome responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with
due regard for the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of
factors, many of which will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments
of defense counsel. For a court to attempt to catalog the appropriate factors in this
elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of consideration, for no list of
circumstances would ever be really complete. The infinite variety of cases and facets to
[December 1976]
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tioning of capital punishment for the first time in twenty-three years was note-
worthy.
Although the future direction of the Court was uncertain as a result of
this change, procedural considerations remained very much a part of eighth
amendment analysis. But the relative significance of procedural matters in re-
lation to the punishment itself was less certain. Apparently, the procedures re-
sulting in the death sentence were beginning to overshadow the character of the
punishment itself.
D. A Contrasting State Court Decision: People v. Anderson
The procedural focus of the United States Supreme Court had not in-
fluenced the California Supreme Court. On February 18, 1972, the Supreme
Court of California rendered its decision in People v. Anderson." The state court
deviated from the Supreme Court's approach in that it focused directly on the
merits of the death penalty itself. The California court concluded that capital
punishment was cruel, unusual and could not be justified as furthering any of the
accepted purposes of punishment. 7
In reaching this conclusion the court stated that capital punishment:
degrades and dehumanizes all who participate in its processes. It is un-
necessary to any legitimate goal of the state and is incompatible with the
dignity of man and the judicial process.38
It noted that frequency of imposition was the proper barometer to employ in
determining whether capital punishment offended contemporary standards of
decency. As the death penalty was infrequently used, the court concluded that
the punishment was incompatible with current standards. Finally, the court
rejected historical justification for the death sentence, stating that incidental
references to the penalty in the California constitution merely recognized its
existence at the time the constitution was adopted.
each case would make general standards either meaningless "boiler-plate" or a
statement of the obvious that no jury would need. Id. at 207-08.
36 6 Cal.3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, cert. denied 406 U.S. 958 (1972).
37 Id. at 645. It should be noted that the court was interpreting article I, section 6 of the
California Constitution (Id. at 633) and thus did not resolve the issue of whether capital
punishment was also proscribed by the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Id. at 634.
38 Id. at 656.
39 Id. at 648. The court made the following comments regarding the acceptance of the
death sentence:
Public acceptance of capital punishment is a relevant but not controlling factor in
assessing whether it is consonant with contemporary standards of decency. But
public acceptance cannot be measured by the existence of death penalty statutes or by
the fact that some juries impose death on criminal defendants. Nor are public opinion
polls about a process which is far removed from the experience of those responding
helpful in determining whether capital punishment would be acceptable to an in-
formed public were it evenhandedly applied to a substantial proportion of the persons
potentially subject to execution. Although death penalty statutes do remain on thebooks of many jurisdictions, and public opinion polls show opinion to be divided as
to capital punishment as an abstract proposition, the infrequency of its actual ap-
plication suggests that among those persons called upon to actually impose or
carry out the death penalty it is being repudiated with ever increasing frequency. Id.
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By denying certiorari, the Supreme Court avoided a direct review of this
dissimilar method of analyzing capital punishment. However, as Furman v.
Georgia" was pending before the Supreme Court at the time Anderson was
decided, the Court would have the opportunity to voice its views on the Cali-
fornia approach almost immediately.
Thus, state court decisions notwithstanding, by 1972 several aspects of
"cruel and unusual" had been fairly well established while others remained un-
certain. It was clear that the phrase mandated respect for human dignity in im-
plementing punishments. For punishments to comport with human dignity they
could not be inhuman or barbarous, they had to be proportional to the offense
committed and had to serve a valid social purpose. However, the significance of
the historical acceptance of punishments was uncertain. The Court almost in-
variably considered whether the punishment in issue had been traditionally ac-
cepted, despite the evolving standards doctrine it simultaneously espoused. More
importantly, it was not certain whether the practice of reversing death sentences
had been abandoned entirely. Whether the procedural definition of cruel and
unusual now exceeded the traditional definition in importance was yet to be
resolved. Finally, the impact, if any, that the California decision would have
on Supreme Court analysis was not determined. As the Furman decision was
pending it was hoped that some of these unresolved questions would be answered.
III. Furman v. Georgia
A. Background
At the time Furman was decided, 41 states, the District of Columbia, and
several federal jurisdictions authorized the death penalty.4 ' However, by any
standard, the imposition of that penalty was infrequent. In 1970 only 127
people received the death sentence; in 1971 the number dropped to 104 and to
a low of 75 in 1972." The infrequency of use prompted some commentators to
conclude that the Supreme Court could, and should, declare the death penalty
unconstitutional.4 Thus, the Court was being pressured to finally rule on the
constitutionality of the punishment per se. It is with this background in mind
that Furman should be read so as to better understand the full import of this
landmark case.
B. The Decision
On June 29, 1972 in a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court announced
its decision in Furman v. Georgia. The opinion is incredibly simple considering
the complexity of the issue involved:
40 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
41 Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring.) The nine states which did not authorize capital
punishment under any circumstances were: Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota,
Oregon, West Virginia and Wisconsin. I.d. at 340, n.79.
42 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929 n.26.
43 Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HAv. L.
Rzv. 1773, 1818-19 (1970).
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Certiorari was granted limited to the following question: "Does the im-
position and carrying out the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments?" 403 U.S. 952 (1971) The Court holds that the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel and un-
usual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The judgment in each case is reversed insofar as it leaves undisturbed the
death sentence imposed, and the cases are remanded for further proceed-
ings.44
However, nine separate opinions were issued, each Justice expressing his own
view on the matter before the Court. This reflects the true nature of the con-
troversy more so than the per curiam opinion. Five Justices supported the per
curiam judgment while four dissented.
1. The Majority Opinions
Of the five Justices who found the death penalty unconstitutional, Justices
Stewart and White took the most moderate positions. Both of them indicated it
was unnecessary to determine the ultimate constitutionality of capital punish-
ment under any circumstances. "5
In assessing this punishment for murder, Justice Stewart concluded that the
sentences in question were, "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck
by lightning is cruel and unusual."4 He felt they were unusual "in the sense
that the penalty of death is infrequently imposed for murder, and its imposition
for rape is extraordinarily rare."" Stewart's conclusion rested on a three-part
analysis: First, the death penalty was a potential sentence in a large number of
cases; second, it was actually imposed in an extraordinarily small number of
these cases; and third, there was no rational differentiating factor which sepa-
rated the cases where it was imposed from those where it was not. Therefore, he
concluded its imposition was wanton and freakish.4"
Justice White also cited the infrequency of imposition as the constitutional
flaw of the death penalty. He felt that the societal needs of retribution and
deterrence were not adequately served when capital punishment was so in-
frequently imposed. 9 The utilitarian argument was that the death penalty failed
44 408 U.S. at 239-40.
45 Id. at 306, (Stewart J., concurring.) Id. at 311, (White, J., concurring.)
46 Id. at 309. Justice Stewart noted that although many people were convicted of rape
and murder during the same time period as the petitioners, the petitioners before the Court
were among a "capriciously selected random handful" of people who were given the death
penalty. Id. at 309-10. This observation led him to conclude that, "the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed." Id. at 310.
47 Id. at 309.
48 Id. at 310.
49 Id. at 311-12. Justice White noted that, "the death penalty is exacted with great in-
frequency even for the most atrocious crimes and that there is no meaningful basis for dis-
tinguishing the few cases in which it is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.
The short of it is that the policy of vesting sentencing authority primarily in juries-a decision
largely motivated by the desire to mitigate the harshness of the law and to bring community
judgment to bear on the sentence as well as guilt or innocence-has so effectively achieved
its aims that capital punishment within the confines of the statutes now before us has
for all practical purposes run its course." Id. at 313.
He also noted that in delegating sentencing authority to a jury, which could refuse to impose
the death sentence regardless of the circumstances, a legislature was allowing its policy to be
dictated by juries and judges rather than legislators. Id. at 314.
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as a credible deterrent when it was not enforced regularly. Furthermore, its
value in retributive terms was doubtful when, in the vast majority of instances,
a prison term was sufficient."0 He also indicated there was no discernable
distinction between the cases in which the death sentence was imposed and
those in which it was not. Justice White thus avoided using the traditional test
of cruel and unusual, i.e. whether the sentence is inhuman and barbarous."'
The position taken by Justice Douglas was more critical of capital punish-
ment. He felt it was important to focus on the statutes as applied, and thus
reached the following conclusion:
[T]hese discretionary statutes are unconstitutional in their operation. They
are pregnant with discrimination and discrimination is an ingredient not
compatible with the idea of equal protection of the laws that is implicit
in the ban on "cruel and unusual' punishments.
52
Noting that the Court was limited by the earlier McGautha v. California"
holding, Justice Douglas was disturbed by the absence of standards for the jury
to use in selecting a sentence. A system that allowed, "[p]eople [to] live or die,
dependent on the whim of one man or 12"' " could not withstand constitutional
scrutiny.
Justices Brennan and Marshall were most adamant in their objections to
capital punishment. Both of them would hold that the death sentence was per se
a cruel and unusual punishment.5
Justice Brennan summarized his position on the constitutionality of capital
punishment as follows:
Death is an unusually severe and degrading punishment; there is a strong
probability that it is inflicted arbitrarily; its rejection by contemporary
society is virtually total; and there is no reason to believe that it serves any
penal purpose more effectively than the less severe punishment of imprison-
ment .... Death, quite simply, does not comport with human dignity.,
He said "[t]he primary principle is that a punishment must not be so severe as
to be degrading to the dignity of human beings."5" If society rejects a punish-
ment, rejection being determined by frequency of use rather than legislative
authorization, 8 Justice Brennan would conclude there is a strong probability
the punishment does not comport with conceptions of human dignity. 9 Thus,
50 Id.
51 It is also interesting to note that Justice White's analysis focused on the needs of the
state rather than the rights of the individual. His analysis led him to believe the value the
state received in extracting the death penalty was insufficient to justify its existence. He did
not feel that the individual was required to sacrifice too much for the crime committed.
52 Id. at 256-57 Justice Douglas devoted a great deal of his consideration to the applica-
tion of the death penalty to members of minority groups, and concluded from several surveys
that the death penalty discriminated against the poor and the Negro. Id. at 249-52.
53 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
54 408 U.S. 238, 253.
55 Id. at 286 (Brennan, J., concurring.) Id. at 359 (Marshall, J., concurring.)
56 Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring.)
57 Id. at 271.
58 Id. at 2'79.
59 Id. at 277.
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the infrequent imposition of the death penalty, in light of its rather frequent
availability, allowed Justice Brennan to conclude society rejected it because of its
incompatibility." Additionally, the Justice viewed the penalty's pattern of im-
position as arbitrary infliction and therefore unconstitutional.6
The pervasiveness of moral overtones is the hallmark of Justice Marshall's
opinion. He felt the members of the Court should balance the penalty of capital
punishment with notions of contemporary self-respect.62 The dynamic nature of
"cruel and unusual" was the most important principle to consider in assessing
the constitutionality of the death sentence.6" In this view, Justice Marshall stated
the Court could take judicial notice of the fact that "for more than 200 years
men have labored to demonstrate that capital punishment serves no useful
purpose that life imprisonment could not serve equally well." Ultimately, he
concluded that society had evolved to the point where capital punishment could
no longer be constitutionally sanctioned.
Hypothesizing that if the citizenry were well informed about capital punish-
ment they would find it immoral," Justice Marshall concluded that at this time
in history capital punishment was unacceptable. 6 Justice Marshall was the sole
member of the Court to squarely rule on the morality issue. Although both
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, in their dissenting opinions, ex-
pressed their personal abhorrence of the death penalty,6" they felt personal con-
siderations should not enter into the decision and therefore did not concur in
Justice Marshall's conclusion. Had the dissenters felt differently, it is possible
Furman would have been significant as the case in which capital punishment
was abolished on grounds of moral aversion. Furthermore, the vote would have
been 7-2 and not likely to face a subsequent challenge.
2. The Dissenting Opinions
The Nixon appointees all disagreed with the Court's resolution of the issue.
However, it should be noted that their opinions were stated with less conviction
than those of the majority. It would certainly be an error to say that the dis-
60 Mr. Justice Brennan said, "In comparison to all other punishments today . . . the
deliberate extinguishment of human life by the State is uniquely degrading to human dignity."
Id. at 291. He further noted that death remained the only punishment that involved con-
scious infliction of physical pain and that a tremendous amount of mental pain attached to the
imposition of the death penalty. Id. at 288.
61 Id. at 293.
62 Id. at 315, (Marshall, J., concurring.)
63 Id. at 329.
64 Id. at 359.
65 Id. at 363.
66 Id. at 360. Justice Marshall cites the cases of United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d
583, 608 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 '(1952); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th
Cir.) cert. denied 355 U.S. 834 (1957) and People v. Morris, 80 Mich. 634, 639, 45 N.W.
591, 592 (1890) as supporting the principle that a punishment is valid unless it shocks the
conscience and sense of justice of the people.
67 Chief Justice Burger stated, "If we were possessed of legislative power, I would either
join with Mr. Justice Brennan or Mr. Justice Marshall or, at the very least, restrict the use of
capital punishment to a small category of the most heinous crimes." Id. at 375, (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Blackmun remarked, "I yield to no one in the depth of my distaste, antip-
athy, and, indeed, abhorrence, for the death penalty, with all its aspects of physical distress and
fear and of moral judgment exercised by finite minds. That distaste is buttressed by a belief that




senters strongly advocated the use of capital punishment. Rather, they felt that
it was not the Court's province to overrule legislative pronouncements. Thus,
the major disagreement was reflected by a difference in perception of the Court's
role in the constitutional scheme of government.6"
Despite personal feelings, Chief Justice Burger was compelled to dissent
because he felt "constitutional inquiry . . .must be divorced from personal
feelings as to the morality and efficacy of the death penalty."69 He acknowledged
that the eighth amendment was not a static concept7" but found no evidence in-
dicating that a punishment explicitly authorized in the Constitution was "sud-
denly" offensive to the conscience of society.7 He disagreed with the majority
position that the limited use of the death sentence reflected society's distaste of
capital punishment. Instead, it attested to the juror's "cautious and discriminat-
ing reservation of that penalty for the most extreme cases."7 In any event, the
efficacy of the punishment was not a proper consideration.7
The heart of the Chief Justice's disagreement with the majority concerned
the propriety of the Court's involvement in this area, noting that this matter was
better suited for legislative resolution.74 He spoke with prophetic accuracy mak-
ing the following suggestion regarding future legislative action:
[L]egislative bodies may seek to bring their laws into compliance with the
Court's ruling by providing standards for juries and judges to follow in
determining the sentence in capital cases or by more narrowly defining the
crimes for which the penalty is to be imposed.
75
This comment is justifiably read as inviting state legislatures to pass the appro-
priate legislation to satisfy the majority of the Court. In this sense, the Chief
68 Although a thorough and comprehensive analysis of this problem is beyond the scope
of this note, the jurisprudential issue of whether judges should discard their moral convictions
when they are on the bench is of particular significance in this area. This recent series of hold-
ings does not represent the moral position of the Court. Rather, it reflects the impact of the
judicial restraint doctrine since most of the Court's members felt they could not interfere with
legislative determinations concerning capital punishment. Thus, it would be a gross distortion
of reality to say that the Court has held that capital punishment is morally justifiable. More ac-
curately, the majority's position is that if state legislatures deem the death sentence to be
morally acceptable, the Court is without power or authority to interject a contrary moral
conclusion and declare the state provision unconstitutional.
In an article which appeared in an earlier edition of the Notre Dame Lawyer, L. S. Tao
noted the need for a morally based decision on capital punishment. Tao, Beyond Furman v.
Georgia: The Need for a Morally Based Decision on Capital Punishment, 51 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 722 (1976). Tao pointed out that in Furman, Justice Powell noted his personal ap-
proval of the new restrictions which were being imposed on the death sentence. Id. at 726.
Thus, if the recent decisions had turned on purely moral grounds, it is possible that Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, who had each expressed their personal dislike of the
punishment, would have joined Justice Powell in support of the position taken by Justices
Stewart and Marshall. In short, the decision could have been much different if the focus of
the decision was concerned with moral considerations. As such a contrary result was a
distinct possibility, perhaps a further examination of the propriety of abandoning moral con-
victions is warranted.
69 Id. at 375.
70 Id. at 382-83.
71 Id. at 381-82. It appears as though "suddenly" is an unfortunate choice of adverbs as
nearly 200 years have elapsed since the Constitution was adopted.
72 Id. at 402.
73 "The Eighth Amendment.. . was included in the Bill of Rights to guard against the
use of torturous and inhuman punishments, not those of limited efficacy." Id. at 391.
74 Id. at 403
75 Id. at 400.
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Justice was engaged in judicial legislating, a practice he clearly did not favor.
Justice Powell also dissented, but more on the basis of the Court's role in
our governmental scheme than the substantive merits of capital punishment. This
position is summarized by the following comment:
Stare decisis, if it is a doctrine founded on principle, surely applies where
there exists a long line of cases endorsing or necessarily assuming the validity
of a particular matter of constitutional interpretation.7 6
Judicial restraint, reasoned Justice Powell, prohibited the Court from reading its
concept of "cruel and unusual" into the Constitution." As the legislature, not
the judiciary, is the proper assessor of public opinion, its judgment should not
be overturned unless extremely ill-conceived." It would be inaccurate to suggest
that Justice Powell took no position on the merits, but the clear thrust of his
reasoning focused on the scope of judicial review.
"Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result," said Justice
Blackmun, "I find it difficult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law,
or of constitutional pronouncement."79 The Court, in his view, could not justify
the suddenness with which it struck down capital punishment, having upheld it
only one year earlier in McGautha."9
Justice Rehnquist also voiced his dissent, essentially for the same basic reasons
as the others. He noted that the Court did not possess the power to strike down
laws it found morally unacceptable. 1 He characterized the decision as an act of
will rather than an act of judgment. 2
In rendering this decision the Supreme Court invalidated the death
penalty statutes of over three-fourths of the states along with various federal
statutes. However, as Chief Justice Burger pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
the Court had left the door open for legislatures to cure the deficiencies five
Justices found fatal in deciding the case.
IV. Assessment of Contemporary Standards
A. Initial Reaction to Furman v. Georgia: Legislative Action
Reaction to the Court's decision was immediate, mixed and intense.8"
Proponents of capital punishment were naturally disappointed. However, op-
76 Id. at 428 (Powell, J., dissenting.)
77 Id. at 458.
78 Id. at 443.
79 Id. at 414, (Blackinun, J., dissenting.)
80 Id. at 408.
81 Id. at 467 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting.)
82 Id. at 468.
83 Perhaps the intensity of the reaction among proponents of capital punishment was best
reflected by the action taken by New Hampshire representative, Louis C. Wyman. Wyman
introduced a proposed amendment permitting state legislatures to impose capital punishment
"in cases involving deliberate and willful taking of human life." Capital Times (Madison,
Wisconsin), June 30, 1972, at 26. Favorable reaction to the decision is typified by the remarks
of Senator Edward Kennedy. He said the decision was one of the great judicial milestones in




ponents of the death sentence were not totally satisfied either, as many of them
felt the Court should have found the punishment to be per se violative of the
eighth and fourteenth amendments.
There is no doubt that legislative action regarding any issue has an impact
on judicial determinations. This is particularly true when a concept such as
"evolving standards of society" is espoused as an important factor in a Court's
analysis. Therefore, it would have been reasonable to conclude that the legisla-
tive response to Furman would weigh heavily on a subsequent decision of the
Court for two reasons. First, the Furman majority had forced legislatures to
enact new statutes in order to reinstate the death penalty. Should the legislatures
reconsider the issue and conclude that the death penalty merited revitalization,
the majority of the Court would likely be bound to strongly reconsider their re-
spective positions. If, in light of Furman, state legislatures had deemed reinstate-
ment of capital punishment a worthwhile effort, it would indicate the possibility
of a judicial misreading of then current opinion. Second, the four dissenters
felt it unwise to intrude into legislative decisions. Therefore, if only a small
number of legislatures were to reinstate the death penalty, it is possible the dis-
senters would feel justified in overruling these few states; for clearly the pre-
dominant legislative opinion would be opposed to capital punishment.
Following Furman, state legislatures passed capital punishment provisions
in unprecedented volume. By 1976, 35 states passed death sentence statutes.84
In 1974, Congress itself enacted a statute providing for the death penalty
when aircraft piracy resulted in death. 5 Clearly, a majority of states were willing
to test the Court's conviction.
This responding legislation is of two major types. First, the majority of state
statutes provide for a mandatory death sentence upon conviction of a specified
crime. Second, a smaller number of statutes call for a balancing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances before the sentence is imposed. The states of
Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Nebraska, Ohio and Utah specifically
provide for an aggravating-mitigating circumstances test."
As a result of this new legislation, 254 persons were sentenced to death in
the years following Furman. By March, 1976, 460 persons in all were awaiting
execution.8 ' Thus, the stage was set for the Court to once again hear argument
on the issue of cruel and unusual punishment as it applied to capital punishment.
V. The 1976 Cases
A. Non-Mandatory Death Sentences
1. Gregg v. Georgia
Troy Gregg was charged with committing armed robbery and murder. In
accordance with Georgia procedure in capital cases, the trial proceeded in a
84 See 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2928, n.23.
85 Antihijacking Act of 1974, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1472(i), (n) (Supp. IV 1974).
86 See note 84, supra for reference to the specific statutes. An indication of the types of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances which state legislatures have deemed appropriate
for the sentencing authority to consider will be found in the Georgia and Florida statutes
considered in part V of this note.
87 Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929 (1976).
('December 1976]
bifurcated manner: the determination of guilt was followed by a separate sen-
tencing stage. The jury found Gregg guilty of two counts of armed robbery and
two counts of murder.88
The penalty stage took place before the same jury. The judge instructed the
jury that it could recommend either the death penalty or life imprisonment, but
it could not authorize the imposition of the death sentence unless it found, beyond
a reasonable doubt, one of the following aggravating circumstances:
One-that the offense of murder was committed while the offender was
engaged in the commission of two other capital felonies, to-wit the armed
robbery of Simmons and Moore.
Two-that the offender committed the offense of murder for the purpose
of receiving money and the automobile...
Three-the offense of murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible
and inhuman, in that they [sic] involved the depravity of the mind of the
defendant.89
The jury ultimately found the first and second of these circumstances to exist and
returned a sentence of death on each count.
The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and the imposition
of the death sentences for each of the murder counts."0 The court determined
that the sentences were not the result of prejudice or any other arbitrary factor.
Additionally, as to the murder convictions, it concluded that the penalties were
not excessive or disproportionate to the penalty ordinarily applied in similar
cases, considering the nature of the crime and the defendant. However, because
capital punishment was rarely applied for such a crime, the court vacated the
death sentences imposed for robbery."
Following Furman, Georgia retained the death penalty for six categories of
crime: murder, kidnapping for ransom or where the victim is harmed, armed
robbery, rape, treason and aircraft hijacking.2 After a verdict, finding or plea
of guilty to one of these capital crimes, a presentencing hearing is conducted
before whoever made the guilt determination. At the hearing:
the judge [or jury] shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation,
and aggravation of punishment.... [The judge or jury shall hear arguments
by the prosecutor and the defendant.] . .. [T]he jury shall retire to determine
whether any mitigating or aggravating circumstances ... exist and whether
to recommend mercy for the defendant.
9 3
The judge or jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that one of ten specified
88 The evidence at the guilt trial established that on November 21, 1973 Gregg and a
travelling companion, Floyd Allen, were picked up by Fred Simmons and Bob Moore. Allen
later told the authorities that Simmons and Moore were shot by Gregg when they were return-
ing to the car. Gregg signed a statement admitting he had shot them but, unike Allen, who
said Gregg had robbed them of their valuables, Gregg indicated he had shot them because of
fear and self-defense claiming that Simmons and Moore had attacked him and Allen with a pipe
and a knife. Id. at 2918-19.
89 Id. at 2919.
90 Gregg v. State, 233 Ga. 117, 210 S.E.2d 659 (1974).
91 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2919.
92 Id. at 2920.
93 GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2503 (Supp. 1976).
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aggravating circumstances exists." Although the statute refers to consideration
of mitigating circumstances, it does not enumerate any such circumstances, nor
does it indicate the relative weight such factors are to be given. Thus it is less
than clear whether the finding of a single mitigating circumstance precludes
imposition of the death sentence.
The Georgia statute also provides for a special expedited review directly to
the Georgia Supreme Court." In affirming any death sentence, that court must
94 G.S.A. 27-2534.1 provides as follows:
27-2534.1 Mitigating and aggravating circumstances; death penalty
(a) The death penalty may be imposed for the offenses of aircraft hijacking or treason, in
any case.
(b) In all cases of other offenses for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge
shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigat-
ing circumstances or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law and any of the fol-
lowing statutory aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:
(1) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed by a
person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony, or the offense of murder was com-
mitted by a person who has a substantial history of serious assaultive criminal convictions.
(2) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was committed while the
offender was engaged in the commission of another capital felony, or aggravated battery, or
the offense of murder was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission of
burglary or arson in the first degree.
(3) The offender by his act of murder, armed robbery, or kidnapping knowingly created
a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or
device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.
(4) The offender committed the offense of murder for himself or another, for the purpose
of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value.
(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney or solicitor
or former district attorney or solicitor during or because of the exercise of his official duty.
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder
as an agent or employee of another person.
(7) The offense of murder, rape, armed robbery, or kidnapping was outrageously or
wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an ag-
gravated battery to the victim.
(8) The offense of murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections employee
or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duties.
(9) The offense of murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the
lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement.
(10) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or
preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himslf or another.
(c) The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by the
evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation . The jury, if its
verdict be a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the
jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable
doubt. In non-jury cases the judge shall make such designation. Except in cases of treason or
aircraft hijacking, unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in
section 27-2534.1(b) is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed. GA. CODE ANN. §
27-2503 (Supp. 1976).
95 Section 27-2537 governs this appeal process and provides as follows:
27-2537 Review of death sentences
(a) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in
the trial court, the sentence shall be reviewed on the record by the Supreme Court of Georgia.
The clerk of the trial court, within 10 days after receiving the transcript, shall transmit the
entire record and transcript to the Supreme Court of Georgia together with a notice prepared
by the clerk and a report prepared by the trial judge. The notice shall set forth the title and
docket number of the case, the name of the defendant and the name and address of his attorney,
a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense, and the punishment prescribed. The report
shall be in the form of a standard questionnaire prepared and supplied by the Supreme Court of
Georgia.
(b) The Supreme Court of Georgia shall consider the punishment as well as any errors
enumerated by way of appeal.
(c) With regard to the sentence, the court shall determine:
(1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice,
or any other arbitrary factor, and
(2) Whether, in cases other than treason or aircraft hijacking, the evidence supports the
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express reference to similar cases it has considered in determining the appropri-
ateness of the death penalty."
This scheme was specifically devised- to avoid the Furman infirmities. The
legislature curtailed judge and juror discretion by establishing the aggravating-
mitigating guidelines. Additionally, procedural rights of the defendant were to
be further assured by providing automatic appeal directly to the state Supreme
Court.
Throughout the opinion the Supreme Court noted its general reluctance to
find the death penalty unconstitutional. Two factors in particular colored the
Court's opinion of its proper role concerning this highly controversial issue.
First, the Court expressed concern over the ramifications of finding capital pun-
ishment to be unconstitutional, noting that only a constitutional amendment
could reinstate the punishment. Secondly, as contemporary community standards
were integrally related to constitutionality and better reflected through legislative
enactments than judicial decisions, the Court considered the elected branch
particularly well suited to determine the validity of the death penalty.
It was in this perspective that the Court addressed itself to the ultimate issue
of whether the punishment of death was, under all circumstances, "cruel and un-
usual" in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. As in Furman,
the holding on this issue was succinctly stated.
We hold that the death penalty is not a form of punishment that may
never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless
of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed
in reaching the decision to impose it.97
jury's or judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in section
27-2534.1 (b), and
(3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed
in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
(d) Both the defendant and the State shall have the right to submit briefs within the time
provided by the court, and to present oral argument to the court.
(e) The court shall include in its decision a reference to those similar cases which it took
into consideration. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with
regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:
(1) Affirm the sentence of death; or
(2) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing by the trial judge based
on the record and argument of counsel. The records of those similar cases referred to by the
Supreme Court of Georgia in its decision, and the extracts prepared as hereinafter provided
for, shall be provided to the resentencing judge for his consideration.
(f) There shall be an Assistant to the Supreme Court, who shall be an attorney appointed
by the Chief Justice of Georgia and who shall serve at the pleasure of the court. The court
shall accumulate the records of all capital felony cases in which sentence was imposed after
January 1, 1970, or such earlier date as the court may deem appropriate. The Assistant shall
provide the court with whatever extracted information it desires with respect thereto, including
ut not limited to a synopsis or, brief of the facts in the record concerning the crime and the
defendant.
(g) The court shall be authorized to employ an appropriate staff and such methods to
compile such data as are deemed by the Chief Justice to be appropriate and relevant to the
statutory questions concerning the validity of the sentence.
(h) The office of the Assistant shall be attached to the office of the Clerk of the Supreme
Court of Georgia for administrative purposes.
'(i) The sentence review shall be in addition to direct appeal, if taken, and the review and
appeal shall be consolidated for consideration. The court shall render its decision on legal
errors enumerated, the factual substantiation of the verdict, and the validity of the sentence.
GA. CoDE ANN. § 27-2537 (Supp. 1976).
96 See note 95 supra.
97 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2932.
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The finding of constitutionality rested upon four major considerations: (1) the
long history of judicial acceptance; (2) contemporary societal acceptance of
the punishment; (3) the useful social purposes served by the sentence; and (4)
proportionality of the punishment to the particular crimes considered.98
Although the plurality recognized that the eighth amendment should be
interpreted in a flexible and dynamic manner," they noted that history and
precedent supported the constitutionality of capital punishment.' Justice Stewart
pointed out that the death sentence was accepted by the Framers, at the time the
fourteenth amendment was adopted and in Supreme Court cases of more recent
vintage.'' Thus the plurality strictly adhered to the two-pronged test of Trop.
While verbally espousing a dynamic interpretation of "cruel and unusual," the
Court nevertheless appeared inextricably bound to consider historical acceptance
as well. If the evolving standards approach was the sole test, reference to the
Framers would be unnecessary. It is evident that, regardless of formal nomen-
clature, the Court was most sensitive to the concepts of stare decisis and prece-
dent, and made its ruling accordingly.
The Court did not, however, neglect the contemporary standards aspect of
the constitutionality test and, in fact, concluded that capital punishment was
acceptable to society. As a basis for this conclusion, the plurality noted that both
legislatures and juries had recently expressed approval of the death penalty.
In expressly relying on the post-Furman statutes, the Court illustrated its
perception of the legislature's role in this area. Justice Stewart pointed out that
recent legislative enactments made it clear that elected representatives had not
rejected capital punishment. 2 Deeming the legislative branch to be a more
appropriate sounding board of public opinion than the judiciary, the Court
therefore concluded a similar popular acceptance of the penalty.
The plurality also viewed the jury as a "significant and reliable objective
index of contemporary values ... ."' Justice Stewart was not convinced that the
infrequent imposition of the death sentence was caused by rejection of capital
punishment per se. Rather, he felt it indicated that jurors selected only the most
atrocious crimes as meriting the ultimate sanction. 4 Combining jury and legis-
lative acceptance, the Court concluded that contemporary society was not of-
fended by capital punishment.
In reference to earlier cruel and unusual decisions, the Court noted the
necessity for any penalty to comport with human dignity. The plurality in-
dicated that to do so a punishment must serve a useful social purpose and thereby
avoid infliction of needless suffering.0 5 It was concluded that two social purposes
were served by capital punishment: retribution and deterrence. Justice Stewart
held that while retribution was no longer the dominant objective of the criminal
98 Id.
99 Id. at 2924. The Court cited Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, Trop v. Dulles,
356 U.S. 86, and Furman v. Georgia as support for this interpretation. Clearly, such an inter-
pretation is mandated by those cases as indicated previously.
100 Id. at 2927.
101 Id. at 2927-28.
102 Id. at 2928.
103 Id. at 2929.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2929-30.
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law, it was still consistent with respect for the dignity of man.106 If, for particular
crimes, society demanded retribution in the form of the death penalty, absent a
clearly unreasonable situation, the plurality would not interfere.
Justice Stewart also opined that the social purpose of deterrence was fulfilled
by capital punishment. Noting that empirical evidence neither supported nor
refuted a deterrent effect, he felt it safe to assume that for some crimes the
penalty did provide significant deterrence. 7 Furthermore, since legislatures
deemed the death penalty to have such a deterrent effect, Stewart would not
dispute that conclusion and on that basis hold the death penalty unconstitutional.
Justice Stewart's reasoning leads to an uncomfortable conclusion. The state
may take a criminal's life merely because society believes the death penalty has
a significant deterrent effect. This belief, in itself, justifies imposition of the
ultimate punishment despite the fact that the empirical evidence is inconclusive.
If cruel and unusual means that life is not to be taken without actual social
justification, logic would require the State to prove a deterrent effect before im-
plementing the death penalty. Clearly, then, notions of human dignity require
that when the deterrent effect is inconclusive, convicted defendants should not
receive the ultimate penalty.
The plurality's strongest argument in upholding the death penalty is the
affirmative legislative response immediately following Furman. Even assuming
that public opinion favors the death penalty, under the eighth amendment such
a factor is not determinative. If this were the case, the eighth amendment would
be a hollow protection, as it would provide no greater protection than what
prevailing attitudes would allow."' Clearly, the protections set out in the Bill of
Rights were meant to secure more than that which society is willing to allow at
any given point in time. The pitfall of relying too heavily on legislative action is
the strong possibility that there will be a resultant weakening of individual rights.
The plurality admitted that there are a great many uncertainties in this
area. The more notable of these include the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment, the reasons jurors seldom impose the sanction and the degree to which
retributive purposes should be allowed to influence the decision to demand the
death sentence. Therefore, the plurality rested its emphasis on the one indis-
putable certainty in this area, the strong legislative response to Furman. Con-
sequently, it is accurate to conclude that protection of a defendant's eighth
amendment rights rests more with the legislature than the Supreme Court. Had
the Court taken a more active view of its role, a different result may well have
been forthcoming.
Having determined that the death penalty was not unconstitutional per se,
the Court proceeded to consider the validity of the particular Georgia statute
before it. The plurality approved of Georgia's bifurcated procedure, noting it
106 Id. at 2930.
107 Id. at 2931.




diminished the possibility of arbitrarily imposed sentences. "' Furthermore, re-
quiring the judge or jury to specify the aggravating circumstances present as a
prerequisite to imposing the death penalty rectified the infirmities struck down by
the Court in Furman. Finally, the plurality approved of the appellate review
provisions, noting that they served as a check against "random or arbitrary im-
position of the death penalty."1 1 For these reasons the Georgia scheme was
upheld.
Although Georgia has made an effort to provide adequate safeguards for
those who face the death sentence, the statutory scheme is far from a defendant's
panacea. Neither this scheme nor any other the Court considered attempted to
deal with non-courtroom discretion. No standards are established for the
prosecutor to employ in reaching certain key decisions inherent in the process.
Indeed, the prosecutor's discretion is virtually unlimited in determining which
crime the defendant will be charged with, and which alternative sentence the
state shall seek. Although the Court expressly indicated that it would not deal
with this issue, the deficiency exists and is potentially a difficult problem which
must be resolved.
Perhaps the most significant deficiency in the Georgia statutory scheme is
that the jury is not adequately appraised of the manner in which mitigating cir-
cumstances are to be considered. It is far from clear whether the presence of a
mitigating circumstance automatically precludes imposition of the death sentence.
Additionally, while aggravating circumstances are specifically enumerated in the
statute, mitigating circumstances are only generally mentioned. Accordingly, it is
likely that jurors will focus an inordinate amount of attention on aggravating
circumstances at the expense of fully considering mitigating circumstances of
equal significance.
2. Proffitt v. Florida and Jurek v. Texas
In Proffitt v. Florida the petitioner, Charles Proffitt, was tried, found guilty
and sentenced to death for first degree murder. The statutory scheme in Florida
differs from the Georgia scheme in only a few particulars. The jury's verdict,
109 Id. at 2935. The plurality opinion reads as follows:
In summary, the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be
imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted
statute that insures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and
guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that
provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised
of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards
to guide its use of the information. Id.
The plurality went on to caution against reading too much into the foregoing comment by
issuing this caveat:
We do not intend to suggest that only the above-described procedures would be per-
missible under Furman or that any sentencing system constructed along these gen-
eral lines would inevitably satisfy the concerns of Furman, for each distinct system
must be examined on an individual basis. Id.
110 Id. at 2940. The plurality went on to state with greater elaboration why it found the
automatic appeal an adequate safeguard.
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the possibility that a
person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. If a time comes
when juries generally do not impose the death sentence in a certain kind of murder
case, the appellate review procedure assures that no defendant convicted under such
circumstances will suffer a sentence of death. Id.
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determined by a majority vote, is only advisory; final determination rests with the
trial judge."' In addition, the Florida statute expressly provides for both mitigat-
ing and aggravating circumstances." 2 Finally, the statute provides greater guid-
111 Proffitt v. Florida, 96 S. Ct. 2960, 2965 (1976).
112 Id. The Florida statute is set out in its entirety below.
921.141 Sentence of death or life imprisonment for capital felonies; further proceedings to
determine sentence
(1) Separate proceedings on issue of penalty.-Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt
of a defendant of a capital felony, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to
determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. or life imprisonment as author-
ized by § 775.082. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as
soon as practicable. If, through impossibility or inability, the trial jury is unable to reconvene
for a hearing on the issue of penalty, having determined the guilt of the accused, the trial judge
may summon a special juror or jurors as provided in Chapter 913 to determine the issue of the
imposition of the penalty. If the trial jury has been waived, or if the defendant pleaded guilty,
the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose, unless
waived by the defendant. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that
the court deems relevant to sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating
or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (6) and '(7). Any such evidence which
the court deems to have probative value may be received, regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to
rebut any hearsay statements. However, this subsection shall not be construed to authorize the
introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitutions of the United States or
of the State of Florida. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present
argument for or against sentence of death.
(2) Advisory sentence by the jury-After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate
and render an advisory sentence to the court, based upon the following matters:
(a) Whether sufficient aggravating cricumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6);
(b) Whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (7),
which outweigh the aggravating circumstances found to exist; and
'(c) Based on these considerations, whether the defendant should be sentenced to life [im-
prisonment] or death.
(3) Findings in support of sentence of death.-Notwithstanding the recommendation of
a majority of the jury, the court after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
shall enter a sentence of life imprisonment or death, but if the court imposes a sentence of
death, it shall set forth in writing its findings upon which the sentence of death is based as
to the facts:
(a) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (6), and
b) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (7),
to outweigh the aggravating circumstances.
In each case in which the court imposes the death sentence, the determination of the court shall
be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (6)
and '(7) and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. If the court does not
make the findings requiring the death sentence, the court shall impose sentence of life imprison-
ment in accordance with section 775.082.
(4) Review of judgment and sentence.-The judgment of conviction and sentence of
death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Florida within sixty (60)
days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record, unless the time is extended
for an additional period not to exceed thirty (30) days by the Supreme Court for good cause
shown. Such revew by the Supreme Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be
heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.
(5) Aggravating circumstances.-Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the
following:
(a) The capital felony was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.
(b) The defendant was previously convicted of another capital felony or of a felony in-
volving the use or threat of violence to the person.
'(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.
(d) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an ac-
complice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempt-
ing to commit, any robbery, rape, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful
throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.
(e) The capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful
arrest or effecting an escape from custody.
(f) The capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain.
(g) The capital felony was committed to disrupt or hinder the lawful exercise of any
governmental function or the enforcement of laws.
(h) The capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.
NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
ance to both the judge and the jury regarding the importance of these circum-
stances:
[Tihe jury [and the judge] is directed to consider '[w]hether sufficient
mitigating circumstances exist which outweigh aggravating circumstances
found to exist'; and . . . [biased on those considerations, whether the de-
fendant should be sentenced to life [imprisonment] or death.113
By a 7-2 vote the Florida statute was upheld for basically the same reasons set
forth in Gregg v. Georgia.
In Jurek v. Texas, Jerry Jurek was convicted of murder in the course of
committing and attempting to commit kidnapping and forcible rape upon a ten
year old girl."4  The Texas statutory scheme differs significantly from the
previous two discussed. Of significance was the fact that Texas severely limits
the categories of murder for which the death sentence may be imposed. The
situations include intentional and knowing murders of peace officers and prison
employees, murders for remuneration, murders committed in the course of carry-
ing out particular felonies, and murders committed during an escape from a
penal institution."'
The statutory procedure calls for the jury to answer three questions. Es-
sentially the questions require the jury to consider: whether the defendant acted
deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death would result;
whether the defendant would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
whether the conduct of the defendant was unreasonable in response to any prov-
ocation which may have existed."' If the jury finds that the State has proved
beyond a reasonable doubt that the answer to each of the three specified ques-
tions is yes, the death sentence is imposed. However, if the jury finds the answer
to any one of the questions to be no, a sentence of life imprisonment will be im-
posed." 7
(6) Mitigating circumstances.-Mitigating circumstances shall be the following:
'(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.
(b) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of
extreme mental or emotional disturbance.
(c) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.
(d) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another person
and his participation was relatively minor.
(e) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of
another person.
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to con-
form his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.
(g) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (Cum.Supp. 1976-1977).
113 Id. Quoted portions are taken from Sections 921.141 (2) (b)-(c) (Supp. 1976-1977)
of the Florida Statutes Annotated.
114 jurek v. Texas, 96 S. Ct. 2950, 2953-54 (1976).
115 Id. at 2955. See Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 19.03 (Vernon 1974).
116 See note 117 infra.
117 Article 37.071 in its entirety reads as follows:
Art. 37.071. Procedure in capital case
(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced
to death or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the
trial jury as soon as practicable. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any
matter that the court deems relevant to sentence. This subsection shall not be construed to
authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United
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This scheme was also upheld by the Court. In announcing the plurality
opinion, Justice Stewart noted that although Texas did not adopt the aggravat-
ing-mitigating circumstances approach, an identical purpose was served by nar-
rowing the categories of crime for which the death penalty could be imposed."
The significance of this particular case is that a new concept was introduced
to the capital punishment issue. Justice Stewart stated that constitutional con-
siderations required the jury to consider mitigating circumstances."" As the
defendant was allowed to introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances in
aiding the jury's determination of the second question, the plurality concluded
that the Texas procedure adequately complied with this new demand. This was
held despite the absence of explicit reference to mitigating circumstances in the
statute.20
These landmark cases indicate that McGautha was not an anomaly in an
otherwise consistent trend of cases. The Court did not refuse to rule on the death
penalty per se and it did not use a procedural defect to reverse a sentence of
death. Rather, the Jackson line of cases is now obsolete and once again the death
sentence is a viable sentencing alternative. The impact of these decisions is sig-
nificant because, given the reluctance of the present Court to intervene in legis-
lative determinations, it is highly unlikely the Court will grant certiorari on the
issue of capital punishment per se in the immediate future. Thus, any relief
sought must be accomplished through either the executive or legislative branch
of government.
States or of the State of Texas. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to
present argument for or against sentence of death.
(b) On conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the follow-
ing issues to the jury:
(1) whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was
committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or
another would result;
(2) whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of
violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) if raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased
was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
'(c) The state must prove each issue submitted beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury
shall return a special verdict of "yes" or "no" on each issue submitted.
(d) The court shall charge the jury that:
(1) it may not answer any issue "yes" unless it agrees unanimously; and
(2) it may not answer any issue "no" unless 10 or more jurors agree.
(e) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue submitted under this article,
the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the jury returns a negative finding on any
issue submitted under this article, the court shall sentence the defendant to confinement in the
Texas Department of Corrections for life.
(f) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review
by the Court of Criminal Appeals within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of
the entire record unless time is extended an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the
Court of Criminal Appeals for good cause shown. Such review by the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals shall have priority over all other cases, and shall be heard in accordance with rules
promulgated by the Court of Criminal Appeals.
Tax. PENAL CoDa ANN. tit. 8 § 37.071 (Vernon 1974).
118 96 S. Ct. 2950 Justice Stewart went on to state that "in essence, the Texas statute
requires that the jury find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance before the death
penalty may be imposed." 96 S. Ct. at 2955-56.
119 Id. at 2956. Justice Stewart amplified the statement in stating:
A jury must be allowed to consider on the basis of all the evidence not only why a
death sentence should be imposed, but also why it should not be imposed. Id.
120 Id. at 2957.
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3. Dissenting Opinions in Gregg, Jurek and Proffitt
Justices Brennan and Marshall continued to adhere to their Furman
positions. Both of them would continue to hold the death penalty per se violative
of the eighth amendment. The dissenting opinions are of importance in that they
address issues the majority deemed less than noteworthy. By examining the
issues discussed by the dissenters, it is possible to observe the significant but subtle
impact judicial philosophy had on these cases.
The remarks of Justice Brennan directly address the Court's preoccupation
with the procedural aspects of capital punishment. 2' The eighth amendment,
in his mind, calls for analysis of the nature of the punishment itself. Furthermore,
he indicated that the Court is required to make a moral decision. Brennan's
forceful comments in this regard were as follows:
[The cruel and unusual punishments clause] embodies in unique degree
moral principles .... This Court inescapably has the duty, as the ultimate
arbiter of the meaning of our Constitution, to say whether, when individuals
condemned to death stand before our Bar, "moral concepts" require us to
hold that the law has progressed to the point where we should declare that
the punishment of death, like punishments of the rack, the screw and the
wheel, is no longer morally tolerable in our civilized society.'
22
As the majority felt the Court could not make moral decisions, the disagreement
concerned the proper role of the judiciary rather than personal acceptance of
the punishment.
Philosophical differences, however, were not the only basis of disagreement.
Justice Stewart found that the death penalty is inconsistent with human dignity
and that it fails to serve a useful social purpose. The sentence was inconsistent
with the fundamental premise that even the most vile criminal is a human being
possessed of human dignity. 2 Furthermore, as the penalty treated humans as
nonhumans,121 it could not withstand constitutional scrutiny. The death sentence
was a pointless infliction of excessive punishment when it did not more ade-
quately achieve social purposes than less severe sanctions. 2 As empirical evi-
dence did not prove death to be a greater deterrent than imprisonment it was
"pointlessly inflicted." As such, it was excessive and therefore prohibited by the
eighth amendment.
Justice Marshall also felt that the punishment failed to further legitimate
social goals. However, the significance of his opinion lies in his ability to
121 Id. at 2971, (Brennan, J., dissenting.) Justice Brennan reiterated the position he took in
Furman, making the following remarks:
In Furman v. 'Georgia, . . . I read "evolving standards of decency" as requiring
focus upon the essence of the death penalty itself and not primarily or solely upon
the procedures under which the determination to inflict the penalty upon a particular
person was made. Id.
122 Id. at 2972.
123 Id. Quoting from his dissenting opinion in Furman. At another point in his opinion
Justice Brennan said, "The calculated killing of a human being by the State involves, by its
very nature, a denial of the executed person's humanity.. . . An executed person has indeed





minimize the importance of legislative reaction to Furman. Pointing out that the
majority conceded that public endorsement could not save an excessive penalty,
he noted that the intrinsic nature of the punishment should be examined for
constitutional flaws before proceeding to consider the acceptability factor. Thus,
in this regard, the passage of statutes had no bearing whatsoever on the resolu-
tion of the issue before the Court.
26
It could be argued that the seven Justices who ruled in favor of the death
sentence had abdicated their responsibility to interpret the Constitution in favor
of legislatures. Less dramatically, by allowing legislatures to heavily influence its
decision, the Court left itself vulnerable to charges that it had rendered the eighth
amendment a "hollow protection" for American citizens.
B. Mandatory Death Sentences: Woodson and Roberts
In Woodson v. North Carolina the Court considered the constitutionality
of mandatory death statutes for the first time.'27 The petitioners in Woodson
were convicted of first degree murder and, as the statute required, sentenced to
death. 2 By a narrow 5-4 margin, the Court held that the mandatory death
penalty statute"' was violative of the eighth and fourteenth amendments.'
Without examining the particular statute, Justice Stewart identified the
constitutional deficiency common to all mandatory provisions. He concluded
that such statutes depart markedly from contemporary standards.'' Thus, they
fail to meet one of the primary tests of constitutionality, comporting with evolv-
ing standards. He noted that the passage of mandatory death statutes did not
indicate acceptance of the practice. The apparent inconsistency in refusing to
accept this particular legislative decision was avoided by concluding that the
states had enacted mandatory provisions only to satisfy the Furman standard.'
If the legislatures had not misread Furman, the Court felt they would have
avoided mandatory death penalty statutes altogether.
Thus, the North Carolina statute was held violative of the Constitution.
Under that scheme, no standards had been promulgated to guide the jury's
sentencing determination. Furthermore, there was a failure to provide assurance
that death sentences were not being imposed arbitrarily or capriciously by
126 Id. at 2974, (Marshall, J., dissenting.)
127 Woodson v. North Carolina, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2987 (1976).
128 Id. at 2981-82.
129 Id. at 2982. The applicable North Carolina statute read in part:
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment,
starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing,
or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson,
rape, robbery, kidnapping, burglary or other felony, shall be deemed to be punished
with death.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-17 (Gum. Supp. 1975).
130 The Court was divided as follows: Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the
Court, along with Justices Powell and Stevens. Justices Brennan and Marshall concurred in
the judgment for the reasons set out in their dissenting opinion. Chief Justice Burger, and
Justices Blackmun, White and Rehnquist dissented.
131 96 S. Ct. at 2990. In this regard Justice Stewart noted that the history of mandatory
death penalty statutes illustrated that the punishment was unduly harsh and unworkably rigid.
Id. at 2986. He indicated that both jurors and legislatures joined in their aversion toward
capital punishment. Id. at 2984, 2987.
132 Id. at 2988-89.
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providing for appellate review.' As the system did not allow for particularized
consideration of each defendant and the nature of each crime,' it was deemed
inconsistent with respect for humanity.'
Roberts v. Louisiana, the second mandatory death sentence case heard that
day, was nearly identical to Woodson and was decided on the same grounds.
Justice Stewart noted that although Louisiana adopted a more narrow definition
of first degree murder than North Carolina, the statute nevertheless failed to
provide adequate sentencing standards. 6 Obviously, then, expressed standards
rather than narrow definitions of offenses are the primary safeguards the Court
looks to in its ultimate decision.
These cases clearly indicate that mandatory death sentences cannot survive
constitutional scrutiny. This is due primarily to the fact that opposition to man-
datory death sentence has been relatively strong throughout this century and
remains strong today. Again, though, such an analysis further emphasizes the
heavy reliance the Court places on historical acceptance of particular punish-
ments.
VI. Dealing With the Death Penalty After Gregg v. Georgia
Similar to the post-Furman situation, the 1976 cases will undoubtedly
precipitate much new legislation. At the very least, those states which currently
have mandatory death statutes must modify them, or enact new provisions, in
order to meet the standards set forth in Gregg and the other 1976 cases. Further-
more, those statutes which possess both mandatory and non-mandatory char-
acteristics are likely to be challenged in the courts or modified by state legisla-
tures. For these reasons, an articulation of the minimum constitutional require-
ments death statutes must possess is useful in order to competently advise legis-
133 Id. at 2991. In summarizing his view of the statute, Justice Stewart said the statute did
not fulfill Furman's basic requirement of "replacing arbitrary and wanton jury discretion with
objective standards to guide, regularize, and make rationally reviewable the process for impos-
ing a sentence of death." Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. More specifically, the plurality opinion reads as follows.
iii capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth
Amendment . .. requires consideration of the character and record of the individual
"offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally in-
dispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death." Id.
136 At this time the Louisiana statute provides as follows:
§ 30. First degree murder
First degree murder is the killing of a human being:
"(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is
engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, aggravated
rape, aggravated burglary, or armed robbery; or
(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill, or to inflict great bodily harm upon,
a fireman or a peace officer who was engaged in the performance of his lawful duties; or
(3) Where the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and has
previously been convicted of an unrelated murder or is serving a life sentence; or
(4) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon
more than one person;
(5) When the offender has specific intent to commit murder and has been offered or has
received anything of value for committing the murder.
For the purposes of Paragraph (2) hereof, the term peace officer shall be defined and
include any constable, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, game warden, federal
law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, district
attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorneys' investigator.
Whoever commits the crime of first degree murder shall be punished by death. LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14.30 (West Supp. 1976).
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latures or litigate death penalty cases. As a result of Gregg and the others, four
basic criteria must be considered in determining whether a statute will be held
constitutional.
Initially, the statutory penalty must comport with civilized standards of
human dignity. Considering the doctrines employed in Weems, Trop, Furman
and the 1976 cases, the test appears to be three-pronged. First, the historical and
traditional use of a punishment must be considered. The contemporary statutory
penalty should be similar to the traditional punishment imposed for the offense
involved. Second, legislative enactments in other states should parallel the new
statute. To a limited extent, a legislature can use its own enactment to indicate
society's acceptance. However, the likelihood of validity is enhanced when the
legislature can direct the court's attention to similar statutes in other jurisdictions.
Conversely, if the new statute departs significantly from prior statutes within the
jurisdiction or current statutes in other states, the penalty appears suspect and
may not be upheld. Finally, examining the penalty most frequently prescribed by
jurors for similar offenses is a worthwhile endeavor. The "human dignity" test
requires courts to determine whether jurors accept the statutory penalty. Thus,
prior jury behavior should be considered before establishing the maximum pun-
ishment for a particular offense.
The Supreme Court recently announced that during the upcoming term it
will reconsider the validity of imposing the death sentence for rape.' The
resolution of the issue will rest almost entirely on human dignity considerations.
It would not be surprising to find the Court striking down the death sentence for
a rape conviction on the ground that jurors and legislatures have traditionally
found that such a penalty is, for this crime, socially unacceptable.
Legislatures must construct sentencing standards which prohibit judges and
juries from arbitrarily or capriciously imposing the death penalty. The op-
portunity for imposing arbitrary sentences is reduced when the judge and jury are
provided with adequate information. Therefore, no unnecessary restrictions
should be placed on the introduction of evidence pertaining to the sentence.uB
The Court intimated that providing for a bifurcated procedure is the best method
of assuring that the jury is given adequate guidance and information."
Although this procedure is not mandatory, it should receive careful considera-
tion.
The sentencing authority should be directed to consider the specific cir-
cumstances of the crime and the individual characteristics of the defendant. The
aggravating-mitigating circumstances approach fulfills this requirement. A
knowledge of eighth amendment history will aid in determining which cir-
cumstances to include. Historically, the eighth amendment has proscribed
barbarous and inhuman punishments as well as those which are disproportionate
to the crime committed. Naturally, the death penalty must be justified in these
terms. Therefore, the mitigating and aggravating circumstances should aid in
explaining the reasons why the death sentence is humane and proportional to the
crime which was perpetrated.
137 Coker v. Georgia, cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3249 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976).
138 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2939.
139 Id. at 2933.
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The statute clearly must allow the judge or jury to consider both the ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances. However, it is not essential that the
statute specifically enumerate both types. Rather, the constitutional requirement
is met if, somewhere in the sentencing process, be it by way of jury instructions,
the answers to specific questions, or other means, due consideration is given
to the reasons the death penalty should not be imposed."' 0 In Jurek, the
Court mentioned that the defendant must be provided with the opportunity to
present evidence of mitigating circumstances. The Court failed, however, to
state whether the defendant must affirmatively demonstrate this right is being
waived voluntarily and intelligently, should he not present such evidence. There-
fore, whether the aggravating-mitigating test requires such a showing is an open
question. In drafting new legislation this problem should be addressed if the
satute is to be adequately insulated from constitutional attack. This problem
can be obviated by specifically enumerating both types of circumstances, provid-
ing that the defendant was advised of his right to introduce evidence regarding
these circumstances, and offering a means for the defendant to indicate he waived
his right to introduce such evidence.
Finally, in Woodson v. North Carolina the Court implied that judicial
review of death sentences is mandated by the eighth amendment.' 4' Automatic
appellate review serves two useful purposes: first, it checks the arbitrary and capri-
cious exercise of the sentencing power;142 and second, it can serve to articulate
the meaning of standards which might otherwise be unconstitutionally vague.
Thus, new statutes should provide for automatic review as it standardizes sen-
tences and helps insure constitutionality for the statute.
More generally, in either the legislative or judicial context, it is well to note
the evils the eighth amendment is designed to curb. The eighth amendment, as
interpreted by the Court, prevents two primary abuses. Clearly, it prohibits
inhuman and barbarous punishments. Additionally, though, it minimizes the
possibility of irrational and inconsistent imposition of the death penalty. With
these considerations in mind, statutes and litigating strategy can be formulated
which adequately deal with the recent Supreme Court rulings.
VII. Conclusion
In the final analysis, capital punishment is valid today because the Court
was reluctant to intercede in legislative determinations. No fewer than four
Supreme Court Justices publicly expressed their personal aversion to the death
sentence. Additionally, two other Justices, Stewart and White, have held the
death penalty unconstitutional under certain circumstances. The issue is ex-
tremely controversial and emotional; its visibility is not likely to diminish merely
as a result of the decisions of this past July.
The notion that the eighth amendment primarily embodies procedural safe-
guards is of recent vintage. Quite possibly that device was employed by the
Court as a means of avoiding the ultimate issue. Inexplicably, the procedural
140 Id. at 2956.
141 Id. at 2991.
142 Id. at 2939.
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doctrine has now become the heart of the Court's analysis. However, given the
Court's unenthusiastic support of capital punishment, it is possible that they
have constructed elaborate procedural safeguards to ameliorate the impact of
legislative pronouncements the Court finds personally distasteful.
The utility of the death sentence is subject to several uncertainties. Dis-
cussions of the deterrent effect of capital punishment all lead to the same in-
conclusive result. The proper role of retribution in the sentencing process has
yet to be firmly established. Although the death penalty is not per se unconstitu-
tional, and it is possible to promulgate statutes which will survive constitutional
analysis, the Court's pronouncements cannot squelch the heated controversy
which surrounds this emotional subject.
Bruce J. Meagher
